Context:
The introduction and implementation of the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), a supplementary system connected to the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), alongside the mandate of tallying VVPAT counts from five randomly selected polling booths in each Assembly constituency to cross-check with the EVM vote count, have failed to mollify critics of EVM usage in Indian elections.
Relevance:
GS2-
- Constitutional Bodies
- Government Policies and Interventions
Mains Question:
Analyse the performance of VVPATs in India since their introduction. Is there a need for a 100% recount of all VVPATs for the purpose of verification or is counting in a randomly selected polling station in each Assembly or Parliamentary constituency sufficient? Present your arguments. (15 Marks, 250 Words).
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT):
- The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) was first introduced during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in India.
- It comprises two components, namely the VVPAT Printer and the VVPAT Status Display Unit (VSDU), which are connected to the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs).
- This system allows voters to verify that their votes are cast as intended. When a vote is cast, a slip is printed containing the candidate’s serial number, name, and symbol, which remains visible through a transparent window for 7 seconds before being automatically cut and deposited into the sealed drop box of the VVPAT.
- VVPAT is primarily used for verification purposes, with the results of EVMs being confirmed through the slips stored in the drop boxes of VVPAT machines.
- Although polling officials have access to VVPAT, voters do not. In cases of allegations of fraud or miscalculation, the paper slips from VVPAT can be considered more authoritative than EVM tallies. However, voter verification using VVPAT is typically conducted only under exceptional circumstances.
- The Election Commission of India (ECI) has the authority to order verification of votes using VVPAT slips in response to complaints.
- Currently, VVPAT slips are counted in a randomly selected polling station in each Assembly or Parliamentary constituency, depending on the type of election being held.
Arguments Raised:
- Some argue that enhancing transparency could be achieved by maintaining a machine audit trail documenting all executed commands within the system, extending beyond the recorded votes in the EVM’s ballot unit and the printed slips in the VVPATs. This would enable an audit to eliminate any potential presence of malicious code.
- Indeed, incorporating such measures could enhance the system’s resilience and be regarded as an improvement to the existing machines.
- On the other hand, some argue that the introduction of VVPATs has introduced potential vulnerabilities that were absent in the standalone nature of EVMs, along with the technical and administrative safeguards that supported the previous system.
- Addressing this concern would entail revising the safeguards to ensure that VVPAT-combined systems are as secure and dependable as standalone EVMs were.
- However, many find the criticism from various quarters, including political parties such as the Congress, advocating for a 100% recount of all VVPATs instead of the current sampling method, incomprehensible.
- They argue that only a comprehensive recount would ensure complete transparency. Consequently, the Supreme Court of India has scheduled a series of hearings regarding this demand.
How has the Performance of EVMs been?
- Despite dire warnings regarding malpractices and EVM hacking, there has been no concrete evidence of any actual tampering with EVMs thus far.
- While EVMs, like any machinery, have experienced glitches and have been promptly replaced in case of malfunctions, the assertion that they are susceptible to hacking or manipulation, despite the presence of existing technical and administrative safeguards, has been made without substantiated proof.
- Sample counting of VVPATs, conducted during both the general election in 2019 and various Assembly elections, has indicated that the discrepancy between the VVPAT recount and the EVM count has been negligible.
- Such discrepancies often stem from minor errors such as failure to delete mock polls from the machine before the voting process or inaccuracies in manually recording the final count from the machine.
Conclusion:
Boosting the recount sample size to enhance statistical significance, either by tailoring the selected number of Assemblies according to the size of each State/Union Territory or by increasing the recount sample in constituencies with narrow victory margins (e.g., less than 1% of the overall votes), could serve as potential solutions. However, demanding a full recount appears excessive and indicates a significant lack of trust in the EVM system itself.
