The article argues that the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls lacks a clear statutory basis and that decision-making within the Election Commission has become unilateral. These claims go to the core of the ECI’s constitutional design: independence from the executive, and action within the bounds of law.

• Statutory gap: the law provides for intensive and special revisions as separate categories; a nationwide “special intensive” revision is not named in the RP Act or the Rules.
• Limits of Article 324: the plenary power fills gaps where the law is silent, but cannot be exercised contrary to an existing statute.
• Article 326: the constitutional scheme is inclusionary; large-scale deletions, which the author puts at 18 crore names citing media reports, would sit uneasily with universal adult suffrage.
• Internal process: citing statements attributed to the two Election Commissioners, the author argues that key decisions were taken without them, which could affect their legal validity.
• Accountability: removal of the CEC requires proved misbehaviour and a demanding impeachment process, and the 2023 Act adds protection from proceedings.

• ECI’s position: the Commission has defended the SIR as an exercise of its powers under Article 324 and Section 21, aimed at removing dead, shifted and duplicate entries and ensuring that only eligible citizens are enrolled.
• Purpose of revision: roll accuracy is itself a constitutional value; inflated rolls can also distort elections.
• Judicial scrutiny: the SIR, which began in Bihar in 2025, has been challenged before the Supreme Court; the legal questions are therefore sub judice and awaiting authoritative resolution.
• Contested figures: deletion numbers include names removed for death, migration or duplication; how many eligible voters were excluded is the disputed, and verifiable, question.

• Mohinder Singh Gill v. CEC (1978) — Article 324 is a reservoir of power where the law is silent, but must be exercised fairly and within law.
• Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) — a person already on the roll cannot be removed without due inquiry and a fair opportunity of hearing.
• Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) — ordered a selection committee (PM, LoP, CJI) for appointing the CEC and ECs until Parliament legislated; the 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister.

• Codify the types, triggers and procedure of roll revision in the RP Act, including the documentary burden on voters.
• Publish constituency-wise deletion data with reasons, and provide accessible appeal mechanisms before final publication.
• Record and disclose the Commission’s collective decisions, consistent with the majority rule upheld in T.N. Seshan.
• Revisit the appointment process to strengthen perceived independence, as the Constituent Assembly and the Supreme Court both emphasised.

Twenty months into negotiations, the India–US trade deal has stalled for a third time. The article argues that, with US tariff policy shifting repeatedly, India should seek legally durable commitments rather than a tariff advantage over competitors that Washington can revise at will.

• The edge is relative: India’s 10% rate matters only in comparison with rivals; a US–Vietnam deal could erase India’s margin overnight.
• The baseline can change: the "structural excess capacity" investigation and sector-specific tariffs, such as those planned on generic medicines from 2028, sit outside any bilateral rate.
• Unequal durability: India’s concessions — industrial tariff cuts, farm openings, purchase commitments — are long-term and politically hard to reverse; the US rate rests on an administrative decision Washington can revise alone.

• A tariff ceiling (standstill): no US duty on Indian goods above the agreed level for the life of the deal.
• Non-discrimination: India not to be treated less favourably than competitors — in effect, an MFN-type assurance within the deal.
• Prior notice and consultation before any new tariff affecting India.
• Sector carve-outs written into the text, starting with pharmaceuticals; zero duty already applies to some Indian specialty medicines.
• Phased and conditional concessions: India’s tariff cuts to be tied to US compliance, so that India’s obligations adjust if the US raises rates or withdraws exemptions.

• Bound vs applied tariff: under WTO rules, a bound rate is a legal ceiling a country commits not to exceed; the applied rate is what it actually charges. The author’s "ceiling" is a bilateral version of binding.
• Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN): GATT Article I principle of non-discrimination among trading partners.
• Snap-back / rebalancing clause: a provision allowing a party to restore earlier tariffs if the other side fails to honour its commitments.

• Strength of the argument: durability and predictability matter for exporters’ investment decisions, and India’s concessions — especially in agriculture — carry domestic political costs.
• Feasibility: binding commitments may be hard to obtain from a US administration that has relied on executive flexibility over tariffs.
• Cost of delay: holding out for stronger terms risks competitors such as Vietnam concluding deals first and attracting supply-chain investment.
• Sensitive sectors: dairy, genetically modified crops and digital trade rules remain areas where India has traditionally resisted concessions.
• Wider strategy: diversification through other agreements, such as those with the UAE, Australia, EFTA and the UK, reduces India’s dependence on any single market.