Courts Should Limit the Governor’s Power to Refer Bills

Context:

The way some Governors have been handling legislation passed by State legislatures is a distortion of the Constitution. After the Supreme Court of India intervened in Punjab’s case and questioned the actions or lack thereof by Governors in Tamil Nadu and Telangana, it was expected that Governors would stop deliberately delaying action on Bills passed by the Assemblies.

Relevance:

GS2-

• Parliament
• Indian Constitution
• Cooperative Federalism

Mains Question:

The judiciary should limit Governor’s power to refer Bills to President without cause. Analyse in the context of recent controversies over the governor’s inaction in state legislature bills. (15 Marks, 250 Words).

What are the Governor’s Powers over Bills?

Article 200:

• Article 200 of the Indian Constitution details the procedure for a Bill passed by a State’s Legislative Assembly to be presented to the Governor for assent.
• The Governor can either assent to the Bill, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration.
• Additionally, the Governor can return the Bill to the House or Houses with a message requesting reconsideration.

Article 201:

• This article states that when a Bill is reserved for the President’s consideration, the President can either assent to the Bill or withhold assent.
• The President may also instruct the Governor to return the Bill to the State Legislature for reconsideration.

Options Available with the Governor:

• The Governor can give assent to the Bill or send it back to the Assembly, requesting reconsideration of some provisions or the entire Bill.
• The Governor can reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration. This is mandatory if the Bill passed by the State Legislature jeopardizes the position of the State High Court.

The Governor can also reserve the Bill if it:

•  Contradicts the provisions of the Constitution,
•  Opposes the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP),
•  Is against the larger interest of the country,
•  Is of grave national importance,
•  Deals with the compulsory acquisition of property under Article 31A of the Constitution.
• Withholding assent is another option, but this is rarely done by any Governor as it would be highly unpopular.

Recent Incidents:

• It seems that upon realizing their supposed ability to indefinitely hold Bills or withhold assent has been significantly limited, Governors have started sending Bills they disapprove of to the President for consideration.
• When the President, based on the Union government’s advice, refuses assent, the State legislatures have no options left.
• This raises the issue of whether the provision for reserving some Bills for the President’s consideration is being misused to undermine federalism.
• In other words, the Centre is given an indirect veto over State laws—something not intended by the Constitution.
• This is precisely the issue Kerala has raised in its writ petition before the Court, challenging the Governor’s decision to send the Bills to the President and the President’s refusal of assent.
• It is now a fitting time for the Court to rule on this matter and set limits on the Governors’ use of this option.

Significant Ruling of the Court:

• It is important to remember that in the Punjab case, the Court ruled that Governors do not have a veto over Bills and that if they withhold assent, they must return the Bills to the Assembly.
• If the Assembly re-adopts the Bills, with or without amendments, the Governors are obliged to grant assent.
• In the Telangana case, the Court noted that Governors are expected to act on Bills “as soon as possible,” emphasizing that this phrase has significant constitutional meaning and that constitutional functionaries should keep this in mind.
• It is surprising that the Governors of West Bengal and Kerala have not learned from these rulings and observations.
• Seven Bills from Kerala, which typically wouldn’t require the President’s assent, were sent to Rashtrapati Bhavan, and four were refused assent without any explanation. The inaction on these Bills lasted from 23 to 10 months.
• West Bengal has also contested the inaction on some Bills, some of which may have been referred to the President.

Conclusion:

The issue goes beyond the political motivations that may have influenced the Governor’s actions or inactions. At its core, it questions whether the Constitution allows such indirect central intervention in the legislative affairs of the States.